• Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2012)
      Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same ...
    • Does the structure of the fine matter? 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2013)
      We study individual compliance behavior with respect to a legal norm in an experimental setting under two different regulatory instruments: emission standards and tradable pollution permits. ...
    • The deterrence effect of linear versus convex penalties in environmental policy: laboratory evidence 

      Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2017)
      We study the individual compliance behavior of polluting firms in an experimental setting under two different penalty functions (a linear and a strictly convex) and two different regulatory ...
    • Uncertain penalties and compliance 

      Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2019)
      We present the results of a series of laboratory economic experiments designed to study compliance behavior of polluting firms when information on the penalty is uncertain. The experiments consist of a regulatory environment ...
    • Uncertain penalties and compliance 

      Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2014)
      Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis ...